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 Abstract 
This article analyses how the concept of ‘local ownership’ has been employed within 
policy frameworks in the context of peacebuilding since the late 1990s. It identifies the 
paradox that lies in the increasing willingness to transfer ownership to the local 
population and the also explicit assumption that self-determination and self-
government have to be avoided in democratisation and post-conflict situations. It is 
argued that it is important to investigate the paradox, the fact that ownership and self-
government have opposed connotations within contemporary frameworks of 
peacebuilding, because in the literature this position is not seen as being contradictory.  
Far from being seen as a strategy containing an irreconcilable paradox, local ownership 
is conceptualised so that it resolves at the same time two problems at the core of 
international governance settings: it limits the international administrators’ 
intrusiveness in national affairs and avoids the risk of giving too much responsibility to 
local authorities. While it is presented as a progressive strategy on all fronts, the 
conclusion of this article is that the concept of ownership, as it has been interpreted by 
the discourses of peacebuilding analysed here, has been of little value to post-conflict 
societies and, furthermore, it has denied their moral and political autonomy. This 
denial, disguised as a discourse that promises to embrace difference, is particularly 
flawed because it seems to permanently defer equality between internationally 
supervised populations and the rest of sovereign nations. 
Keywords  
Peacebuilding, Local ownership, Self-government, Hybridity, Reflexive Cooperation 
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Conceptualising Local Ownership as ‘Reflexive 
Cooperation’: The Deferral of Self-government 
to Protect ‘Unequal’ Humans? 1 
 
Pol Bargués-Pedreny 
 
Introduction 
This article unpacks how the concept of ‘local ownership’ has been employed 
within policy frameworks in the context of peacebuilding since the late 1990s 
(OECD 1996; UNDP 2001; World Bank 2000). The term has widely been understood 
in the literature as ‘the extent to which domestic actors control both the design 
and implementation of political processes’, which is essential because, the wisdom 
goes, ‘any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to 
fail’ (Donais 2009a: 3). The concept is portrayed positively first for its practical 
benefits, as it improves the results of the mission if local authorities are able to 
take the initiative; secondly, it is also endorsed because of its ethical connotation 
of transforming externally dominated and overly invasive practices and correcting 
‘a paternalistic attitude of donor countries towards local actors’ (Reich 2006: 7; see 
also OECD 2011: 45). While the practical and ethical importance of ownership is 
seldom disputed, there is a wide consensus too that ownership is rarely realised in 
practice. Indeed, one of the biggest concerns in the literature is how to 
operationalize this concept more successfully in post-conflict scenarios. As Ganson 
and Wennmann (2012: 6) write: the challenge is that ‘the international rhetoric of 
‘local ownership’ must be made substantially more real’.  
What is intriguing is that even if there are policy reports (and academic critiques 
of these reports) continuously highlighting the need to enable genuine local 
control of peace processes, these processes exclude de facto self-determination or 
self-government. This is intriguing because, as Chesterman (2007: 20) notes, in its 
broadest sense, ownership means ‘self-determination’, a basic principle of 
international law (e.g. UN Charter, ICCPR, ICESCR), which nowadays seems to have 
                                                          
 1 I would like to thank Blai Bargués, David Chandler, Tobias Debiel, Frank Gadinger, Aidan Hehir, 
Volker Heins, Thomas Mills, Elisabet Portavella, Mathieu Rousselin and Jessica Schmidt for 
comments on previous drafts. I am also grateful to the editor of the series, Rainer Baumann, 
and to the Centre for Global Cooperation Research (Käte Hamburger Kolleg), for their 
support and for giving me the opportunity to present an earlier version of this paper at a 
Research Colloquium, in which I received very useful comments from the audience. Thanks 
also to all of them. 
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lost its punch.2 Rather than understanding ownership as akin to self-determination, 
studies increasingly define it as ‘a shorthand way of describing the relationship 
between different local and international actors’ (Martin and Moser 2012: 3). 
Within this narrower definition, in which self-determination is not contemplated, 
the big question is how to improve the nature of the exchange between partners. 
Reich (2006: 4), for example, who calls ‘literal’ or ‘full’ ‘ownership’ an ‘unfulfillable 
goal’, wishes to make the relationship between donors and recipients more 
emphatic by introducing the notion of ‘learning sites’. For Donais (2009a: 21), 
similarly, ‘local ownership’ is ‘a delicate, complex, and often shifting balancing act, 
in which the division of responsibilities between outsider and insider is constantly 
calibrated and adjusted as a means to advancing the peace process’. Krogstad 
(2014) rightly notes that the literature has mainly focused on the difficulties faced 
by donors, but, instead of giving support to self-government, he focuses on the 
cases in which local authorities ask for an international supervision of their country. 
For Krogstad (2014: 1), there is no longer a conflictive relation between 
international and local, ‘coloniser’ and ‘colonised’, because sometimes receivers are 
the ones ‘inviting the coloniser back’. To this I wish to add: what if receivers do not 
invite her? Or what if they do not even have the prerogative to make the invitation? 
This article thus explores the paradox that lies in the increasing willingness to 
transfer ownership to the local population and the also explicit assumption that 
self-determination and self-government have to be avoided in democratisation and 
post-conflict situations. 3 It is argued that it is important to investigate the 
paradoxical fact that ownership and self-government have opposed connotations 
within contemporary frameworks of peacebuilding, because in the literature this 
position is not seen as being contradictory. Far from being seen as a strategy 
containing an irreconcilable paradox, local ownership is conceptualised so that it 
resolves at the same time two problems at the core of international governance 
settings: it limits the international administrators’ intrusiveness in national affairs 
and avoids the risk of giving too much responsibility to local authorities. In other 
words, local ownership—increasingly understood by most policy reports and the 
academic literature as a learning relation, cultural exchange or reflexive 
cooperation between donors and recipients, in which self-government is no longer 
an issue demanding a response — has sought to overcome the wrongs of both top-
down and bottom-up processes of peacebuilding. However, the conclusion of this 
article is that the concept of ownership, as it has been interpreted by the 
discourses of peacebuilding analysed here, has been of little value to post-conflict 
societies and, furthermore, it has denied their moral and political autonomy. This 
denial, disguised as a discourse that promises to embrace difference, is particularly 
flawed because it seems to permanently defer the equality between 
internationally supervised populations and other sovereign nations. 
                                                          
 2 To clarify, this paper is not a defence of self-determination. Indeed, it is not even about self-
determination as such. It is about how ‘local ownership’ has been understood in peacebuilding 
settings so that it means something different to self-determination and self-government. For 
a defence of the principle of self-determination see, for example, Philpott (1995). 
 3 See the research developed in the Käte Hamburger Kolleg / Centre for Global Cooperation 
Research, in particular in Unit 4 ‘Paradoxes and Perspectives of Democratisation’, 
http://www.gcr21.org. 
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This article is divided into three parts. The first section focuses on how ownership 
was introduced at the end of the 1990s as a way to rectify the problems of overly 
intrusive interventions and of democratisation processes, as illustrated in the case 
of Bosnia. Initially, the promotion of ownership thus implied a process in which the 
adequate social and political conditions of post-war societies had to be developed 
before actual self-government could be enacted. The second section analyses how, 
over the past few years, international policy-makers have shown a greater 
commitment to granting local ownership. However, more ownership has rarely 
implied that the local population can take full control of the state, as the example 
of Kosovo demonstrates. It is argued that, in the governance of post-war situations, 
ownership is increasingly conceptualised both as a means and an end of the 
peacebuilding process (rather than as a means to a final state of self-government). 
Finally, the third section deals with the critique of liberal peacebuilding operations. 
Critical scholars indicate the need to think of local ownership as a learning relation 
or ‘cultural exchange’ that resists simplistic dichotomies—such as, for example, the 
divide between international and local actors—in order to foster a more locally 
engrained peace. Yet critical frameworks do not argue for self-government either. 
Along similar lines to policy perspectives, therefore, they seek to resolve the 
dilemmas associated with the process of transferring local ownership by turning 
demands of sovereignty or self-government into unnecessary or ‘unthinkable’ 
questions. In so doing, it is argued that the concept of local ownership—as it is 
understood by policymakers and critics of peacebuilding—downgrades the capacity 
of post-conflict societies to think and choose for themselves and in consequence is 
of little relevance for the current concerns of the people in the name of which 
peacebuilding is being renovated. 
Peacebuilding and the dilemmas of transferring local ownership 
In 1996, reflecting on the experience of the last five decades of international 
development, the OECD (1996: 9) published a report to set a new strategy for the 
21st century. ‘Success will depend’, it argued, ‘upon an approach that recognises 
diversity among countries and societies and that respects local ownership of the 
development process’. The concept of ‘local ownership’ soon became a mantra for 
international organisations. From the UN to the World Bank, international 
institutions believed that there were no universally applicable strategies for 
development. For this reason, developing people—rather than international 
administrators importing successful institutions from elsewhere—ought to be in 
the driver’s seat of economic and political reforms and the specific socio-cultural 
context of every society had to be taken into account (CIDA 2002; Stiglitz 1998a, 
1998b; UNDP 2001: 20–30; World Bank 2000: 8–9; 2001: 191–2). 4 As one of the 
                                                          
 4 Along the lines of the OECD, most of reports considered that ‘ownership’ was one of the 
‘principles of effective development’. The Canada International Development Agency, for 
example, wrote: ‘development strategies, if they are to be sustainable, must be developed by 
recipient countries—their governments and people—and they must reflect their priorities, 
rather than the priorities of donors’ (CIDA 2002: 4). 
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World Bank (2001: vi) reports stressed: ‘action must also take place with local 
leadership and ownership reflecting local realities. There is no simple, universal 
blueprint’. 
In post-war scenarios, the processes of transferring local ownership were 
considered more burdensome than in developing contexts because groups were 
generally divided by the conflict and there were periodic relapses of violence after 
the peace agreement. However, on the other hand, very hands-on and highly 
invasive international administrations in post-war situations, such as the missions in 
Kosovo and East Timor, were deemed much more problematic. These interventions 
were economically and politically costly because they lacked legitimacy and it 
proved to be almost impossible to implement institutions without the approval of 
local actors. As Chesterman (2002: 4–8) observes, it was after the dubious results of 
these exceedingly interventionist practices that the UN shifted the focus towards a 
‘light footprint approach’ in Afghanistan, in 2001, where the need of ownership and 
the involvement of the Afghan Transitional Administration were central concerns. 
A UN official expressed his willingness to correct the overbearing outlook of 
previous intervention practices in these terms: ‘we are protecting a peace process 
from the hubris of the international liberal agenda as promoted by donors’ (quoted 
in Chesterman 2002: 4). Ownership thus was introduced as a politically correct 
concept, which also seemed to provide more efficient results with regards to 
humanitarian assistance because it widened the level of acceptance and legitimacy 
among the local population (Kumar 1999: 9). Local inhabitants were no longer 
conceived as passive receivers or victims, but as key actors that could actively 
interact with international partners to develop context-sensitive solutions 
(Pouligny 2009: 5). 
However, the rise of ownership as a policy strategy in the broader context of 
post-conflict democratisation and peacebuilding projects at the end of the 1990s 
contained a potential inconsistency. This is because the commitment to reflect the 
priorities of the local population—rather than those of external agencies—and 
devolve responsibility to the nationals appeared at a moment when there was the 
suspicion that democratic processes could disturb the efficiency of peacebuilding 
missions. After the experiences of post-conflict peacebuilding of the early 1990s, 
one of the main assumptions was that rapid elections after the peace settlement 
would reproduce the divisive lines of the war, contributing to the further 
destabilisation of the country (e.g. Carothers 2002; Paris 2004: 151–78; Mansfield 
and Snyder 1995). As Jack Snyder (2000: 20) summarises: ‘the transition to 
democratic politics is meanwhile creating fertile conditions for nationalism and 
ethnic conflict, which not only raises the costs of the transition but may also 
redirect popular political participation into a lengthy antidemocratic detour’. 
Snyder was optimistic that democratic governments were stable, but his point was 
that countries experiencing democratisation heighten the risk of war. It is against 
this assumption of the problems of democratisation that I seek to highlight the 
inherent paradox haunting the operationalization of the concept of local 
ownership within peacebuilding frameworks.  
For instance, had ‘ownership’ been taken literally, for example, as a synonym for 
self-government, international administrators would have found themselves in a 
contradiction. That is, by proposing ownership as self-government, they would 
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have infringed the widespread assumption shared by academics and policymakers 
at the end of the 1990s that democracy was a destabilizing factor in post-war 
societies. Nevertheless, as I shall demonstrate, far from it being recognised as a 
paradox, international administrators were to understand local ownership as being 
detached from its meaning of self-determination precisely to resolve this 
governance dilemma: being able to avert the dangers of democratisation, which 
could lead to conflict, and of top-down interventions, which could be reminiscent 
of colonialism. 
Let me illustrate with a brief example from Bosnia how international agencies 
introduced local ownership as a progressive strategy on two fronts: it provided an 
escape route both from the risks related to democratising conflict-affected 
environments and from a neo-colonial approach led by international 
administrators. In 1999 the High Representative, Wolfgang Petritsch, stated that 
the UN was undertaking a new approach, which he referred to as ‘ownership’. For 
him, this new approach meant that the responsibility for the peace process and 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement lay with the Bosnian electorate 
and its elected leaders. However, while Petritsch was defending ownership, at the 
same time, he was discriminating in favour of the leaders he preferred and was 
convinced that Bosnians were not yet ready to make the ‘appropriate’ (read here 
non-nationalistic) democratic choices (Chandler 2000: 201–202; Hughes and 
Pupavac 2005: 882). In an apparent incongruity, the UN affirmed its commitment to 
local ownership after its ruling administration had been prolonged indefinitely and 
the High Representative had adopted further substantial powers in a meeting in 
Bonn only two years earlier. The point here is not that Petritsch was hypocritical or 
fallacious, but to understand that for the High Representative the approach of 
‘ownership’ did not imply ‘self-government’ and it was certainly not contradictory 
with further international assistance. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems 
obvious to say that, even if international policymakers have increasingly 
transferred responsibilities to the local population, the process of ownership 
initiated by Petritsch has continuously limited self-government, supposing that the 
Bosnians are not capable of taking autonomous actions.5 
The more policy-oriented literature in the first decade of the 21st century also 
conceived local ownership in similar ways: as a strategy which, on the one hand, 
represents a step forward in avoiding the overly intrusive practices of early 
intervention; on the other, full self-government has to be limited until certain 
requirements have been met (Chesterman 2007; Nathan 2007; Pouligny 2009; Reich 
2006; Scheye and Peake 2005; Tschirgi 2004). For these scholars there is thus a 
need to support and respect local interests and practices in order to allegedly 
                                                          
 5 For critiques along these lines, see Chandler (2000: 194); Pupavac (2004: 391–4). Both authors 
argue that the apparent contradiction between denying self-government and promoting 
ownership is not a contradiction according to the lens of international policy-makers. This is 
because there has been a redefinition of the traditional meaning of democracy and citizens’ 
political rights: now these come to be understood as processes that can be enhanced or 
empowered to meet international standards (Chandler 2000: 162–3; 2010; Pupavac 2004: 
393).  
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renovate internationally driven statebuilding projects.6 Nonetheless, much like the 
perspective taken by international administrations, they also think that the delicate 
realities of post-conflict situations place some constraints on the transfer of 
ownership. Scheye and Peake (2005: 259), for example, argue that local ownership 
is devoted to untangling the following ‘Gordian knot’: there is ‘the need to ensure 
that reform is ‘locally owned,’ coupled with the awareness that the actions of often 
the same ‘local owners’ necessitated the intervention of the international 
community in the first place’. In this fashion, Chesterman (2007: 7) notes that it 
should not be forgotten that ‘operations have tended to be undertaken precisely 
because of the malevolence or incapacity of existing governance structures’. 
Furthermore, Narten (2009: 252) takes it as given that ‘international assistance’ is a 
requirement in order to avoid the risk of ‘falling back into violence and chaos’. 
These authors contend that the autonomy of post-conflict societies is 
unquestionably problematic and thus some degree of external interference is 
mandatory. The hypothesis is that without an international presence, ‘they’ will fail 
again or, at least, ‘they’ will be much worse.7 On this assumption, local ownership is 
understood to be a delicate process leading to self-government, which consists in a 
careful negotiation and cooperation between international and national agents to 
resolve the dilemma of giving too much power to either local or international 
agents. As Scheye and Peake (2005: 259) put it: ‘the dilemma is how to chaperone a 
process that incorporates ‘local ownership,’ but that does not permit either 
international actors or the compromised ‘local owners’ to dictate programming 
choices’. Comparably, Narten (2009: 278) proposes ‘a field-based emphasis on 
gradual (co-)ownership between external and local actors’ in order to, for example, 
reduce more effectively the power of ‘local spoilers.’8 The underlying conclusion is 
that ownership needs to be carefully enhanced to avoid giving authority back to 
those that could jeopardise the peace process. 
Throughout most of the decade 2000-2009, along the very same lines of these 
academic commentators, international organisations have accepted that the 
process of successfully transferring authority depends on international 
administrators developing the structural conditions that make national ownership 
‘efficient’ (UNDP 2010: 23).9 In 2005, in a manual for conflict resolution and 
                                                          
 6 For example, Nathan (2007: 4) writes: ‘What is required is not local support for donor 
programmes and projects but rather donor support for programmes and projects initiated by 
local actors. The question for donor governments is not “how can we undertake Security 
Sector Reforms in partner countries?” but “how can we support local actors who want to 
undertake SSR in partner countries?”’ See also Pouligny (2009: 22); Tschirgi (2004: 16). 
 7 Arguing against those scholars who oppose that there is the need for external interference, 
Paris argues, first, that ‘let them fail’ is not option and, second, that less intrusive operations 
have not yielded better results. His conclusion is that ‘most host countries would probably be 
much worse off if not for the assistance they received’ (Paris 2009: 98–108). 
 8 Analysing the case in Kosovo, for example, Narten (2009: 275, 279) considers Vetëvendosje a 
potential spoiler group. For him, the solution to the problem of spoilers would be to ‘invest 
more in educational projects for the general public’.  
 9 For example, the Utstein group advises that a ‘simple commitment to local ownership’ without 
preconditions can be ‘fatal to hopes of successful peacebuilding’. Instead, ‘there needs to be 
very careful research about the identity and background of project partners, and recognition 
Bargués-Pedreny  |  Conceptualising Local Ownership as ‘Reflexive Cooperation’ 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 11 11 
 
 
peacebuilding, the OECD (2005: 4, 7) wrote: ‘in all peace-building interventions 
particular emphasis should be given to national ownership of the process. Work 
may need to be done to ensure that it is truly representative and not perpetuating 
existing divisions in society’. This statement needs a careful attention. While the 
OECD does not specify why the ‘existing divisions in society’ are ‘not 
representative’, it nevertheless assumes that there is the need to work on building 
favourable ‘country conditions’ and ‘institutional capacity’ to achieve that 
ownership is ‘truly representative’. For the OECD, therefore, ownership does not 
imply the right to autonomously own or choose, but it is subordinated to 
prerequisites or amendments that internationals allocate and that indicate how 
ownership ought to be. 
Within this framework, questions about the right to self-determination or direct 
voting mechanisms such as referenda are left aside until the adequate conditions 
are settled. Chesterman (2007: 7) argues conclusively that ‘ownership is certainly 
the intended end of such operations, but almost by definition it is not the means’. 
How much time will be needed for the end of the operation, he does not say. But 
his conclusion serves to reaffirm that the literature has reached a consensus on the 
fact that the transfer of ownership does not mean transferring self-government, at 
least, not yet (e.g. see contributors in Ebnöther and Fluri 2005). The assumptions 
that post-war societies are not yet ready and, therefore, in need of international 
interference, is indicative of the dominant conceptualization of ownership since its 
initial formulations: rather than framing it as a democratic right to self-
determination that populations have or do not have (Philpott 1995), it is 
formulated as a process that can be enhanced or built from a co-ownership 
perspective. In the next section, I focus on contemporary policy approaches, which 
have pushed this conceptualisation of ownership further in order to resolve its 
inherent dilemmas ‘forever’ (avoiding the possibility that either international or 
local actors could dictate how the end state of peace would be). It will be argued 
that today ownership is no longer seen as a process the goal of which is 
transferring authority to the locals, but is considered as a goal in itself. That is, local 
ownership is understood as a process without a clear end, in which there is 
constant hope that ownership can be ever more genuine. In this process, therefore, 
granting full sovereignty to the people is a step that has become unthinkable. 
Making ownership more ‘real’ and self-government ‘unthinkable’ 
By the end of the decade after the year 2000, international organisations 
progressively placed greater emphasis on the requirement that the locals take 
                                                                                                                                                              
that it will be best to attempt to increase the degree of local ownership slowly and carefully 
as experience offers a growing basis of trust. Otherwise, local ownership risks being a code 
for working with the most powerful and most opportunistic sectors of society’ (Smith 2004: 
26–7). 
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command of post-war situations.10 ‘Time and again, it has been noted that if there 
is one overriding lesson for the achievement of development results—and for the 
sustainability of such—it is the importance of national ownership’, stated the UNDP 
(2010: 45).11 A quick glance at contemporary reports is enough to identify 
systematic efforts to transfer responsibilities to the locals, while respecting the 
specificity of every context. As the UN (2010: 6) argues, ‘peacebuilding strategies 
must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, 
based on national ownership’. The OECD has a similar position: ‘it is absolutely 
necessary to give the state space to establish itself and to ensure that local 
ownership leads to locally grown institutions’ (OECD 2008: 101; see also OECD 
2011: 23–5). 
One of the crucial differences regarding earlier peacebuilding operations is that 
international organisations seek to make ownership more ‘real’ (Ganson and 
Wennman 2012: 6). That is, in contrast to the previous approach in which ownership 
was the end that justified other means; now ownership is understood to be both 
the means and the end of the peacebuilding process.12 In this vein, international 
agencies have limited their role to mere assistance, support or facilitation of the 
locally owned process of cultivating resilience to violence and other crises (e.g. 
OECD 2010; UNDP 2012). 
In being both the means and the end of the project of peace, peacebuilders have 
sought to solve more proficiently the dilemmas associated with local ownership 
present in governance processes (having either overly intrusive international 
partners or excessively powerful local spoilers). Now, achieving local ownership 
requires international partners to become more self-reflexive throughout the 
process, aware of their limits and culturally biased assumptions, and more open to 
the socio-cultural backgrounds of other societies. At the same time, however, their 
role as facilitators is still considered to be important to ensure that ownership 
actually results in a plural and all-encompassing execution of domestic politics. It 
always appears that further work needs to be carried out to ‘walk the talk’ and 
guarantee ‘genuine national ownership’ (e.g. OECD 2011: 45; UNDP 2012: 101). 
Predicated on the belief that there can be ever-greater culturally sensitive policies 
and more inclusive measures, international administrators legitimise the 
prolongation of the process of transferring local ownership under international 
auspices. 
                                                          
 10 Nowhere has this tendency been more apparent than in recent policy reports that have 
focused on strengthening the ‘resilience’ of post-war societies as a strategy to build peace 
(e.g. OECD 2008; 2011; Ganson and Wennman 2012). 
 11 For another example see the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding, 
integrated by developing states and partners. Its members have agreed to ‘change the policy 
and practice of engagement’: ‘As part of the “New Deal” we commit to focus on new ways of 
engaging, to support inclusive country-led and country-owned transitions out of fragility 
based on a country-led fragility’ (IDPS 2011). 
 12 See Chesterman’s quote above. Recently, the OECD (2011: 20) specifies that ‘statebuilding is 
primarily a domestic process that involves local actors, which means that the role of 
international actors is necessarily limited’.  
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The result is that efforts to enhance more substantial local ownership within 
contemporary governance frameworks are rarely translated into de facto self-
government. Rather than providing full autonomy or ownership to the local, local 
ownership has turned into a long-term emancipatory process in which autonomy is, 
at the same time, enhanced and supervised—without these positions being seen as 
contradictory. Schmidt (2013: 14) goes a step further to argue that, within current 
internationally administered democratisation practices, populations come to 
‘acknowledge’ and ‘fulfil’ their ‘lack of autonomy’. However counter-intuitive this 
claim may sound, the EU Mission (2008-present) in the statebuilding project in 
Kosovo seems to be translating this idea into practice.  
From its inaugural report, EULEX (2009: 9) has stressed that ‘there would be total 
ownership of the reform process by the relevant Kosovo institutions’. Its 
commitment towards effectively operationalizing local ownership seems clear in 
this statement: 
The EULEX Programmatic Approach is based on a rigorous 
adherence to the principle of ‘local ownership’. In practice this has 
meant that the final responsibility for translating each 
recommendation into a[n] MMA Action has rested with the relevant 
institutions of Kosovo’s rule of law. In this way, the EULEX 
programmatic approach is designed to help Kosovo’s rule of law 
bodies to make the changes themselves, rather than rely upon an 
international presence to do it for them (2010: 6). 
The willingness to transfer responsibility and leadership to the Kosovars is 
purposely different from the intrusive strategy led by the UN administration during 
the immediate post-war period. However, EULEX’s predisposition to promote 
ownership is belied by the important fact that it entered into force just before the 
Kosovo Assembly declared the independence of the country in February 2008.13 
This implies that EULEX, which operates under UN Resolution 1244 and does not 
recognise Kosovo’s independence,14 is enhancing ownership to a population that is 
not sovereign. But under EULEX approach this is not inconsistent: it understands 
ownership as if there were no longer a conflictive binary or opposition between 
international supervision and local leadership. That is, ownership has turned into a 
process that has removed any tension between international (potentially neo-
colonial) and local sovereignty (potentially problematic). Within this framing, in 
which full sovereignty is a priori eclipsed as an immediate possibility, ever more 
genuine local ownership can indeed become the means of a cooperative process of 
                                                          
 13 As discussed above, in the case of Bosnia, talks about ‘ownership’ were also introduced after 
the UN mission acquired further regulatory powers. 
 14 It is important to add here that most scholars emphasise that there are many international 
pressures—e.g. divided Security Council and divided EU—and domestic constraints—e.g. 
Serbia’s opposition to Kosovo’s independence and the territorial disputes in the north of the 
country—that make it difficult for EULEX to recognise Kosovo as an independent state (see, 
for example, Greiçevci 2012; Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012; Weller 2008). However, the 
point here is to highlight that EULEX intends to promote ownership without transferring self-
government to the Kosovars.	
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peacebuilding that has an unclear end.15 Although the dilemmas of transferring 
ownership may be ‘solved’, the discourse of promoting ownership seems to 
constrain the political agency of the Kosovars who, to paraphrase Schmidt, 
acknowledge and fulfil their lack of autonomy. 
At least in the case of Kosovo, the process of granting ownership to some degree 
and discarding self-determination and full self-government from the equation is 
problematic because this process goes against the preferences of the immense 
majority of the Kosovars. The cause of self-determination has been a priority for 
the Kosovars at least since the summer of 1990, when the majority of members of 
the Assembly voted to declare Kosovo a Republic within the Yugoslav Federation 
(IICK 2000: 43–4). It is very likely therefore that, since the possibility of self-
government is left out of EULEX’s schema, international policymakers are doing 
little to resolve the concerns of the majority of the Kosovars. The efforts to respect 
and support the preferences and priorities of the local, which are explicit in 
contemporary policy texts, become vacuous if these do not include or respond to 
their principal plea. 16 To be clear, the conclusion drawn here is not that Kosovo 
(and other post-conflict societies) ought to be independent or freed from 
international interference. What I seek to understand is the meaning and 
implications of a strategy that promotes ownership and seeks to offer a deep 
respect of local sensitivities but still places firm restrictions regarding self-
government. It is important to interrogate the understanding of ownership as a 
process of ‘reflexive cooperation’ because, at least in the cases of Bosnia and 
Kosovo, this approach seems to be frustrating one of the citizens’ central agenda. 
Let me finish this section with a brief remark that introduces the conclusion of 
this paper. In a discussion about ‘tolerance’, Slavoj Zizek (2002: 542) argues that 
there are limits on tolerance in liberal democracies: ‘We can go on making our small 
choices, ‘reinventing ourselves’, on condition that these choices do not disturb the 
social and ideological balance’ (see also Furedi 2011: 12). This description could be 
applied to Kosovo, and to debates about ownership more broadly, since certain 
preferences of the local population have been tolerated, while others have been 
denied. However, when Zizek (2002: 548) is developing the lines of his argument, 
he refers to the impossibility in contemporary democracies of introducing radical 
changes in the political and economic system. Against this constraint, his text is a 
‘plea for Leninist intolerance’. He wants to ‘repeat, in present worldwide 
conditions, the Leninist gesture of reinventing the revolutionary project’. And he 
adds: ‘This simply means that we obtain the right to think again.’ In the context of 
post-war societies, the freedom of choice of their citizens has been constrained to 
higher levels. Post-conflict societies have not been restricted from carrying out any 
revolutionary project, as the one Zizek is proposing. What has been foreclosed 
throughout the statebuilding process is the possibility that these populations could 
govern themselves, like any other sovereign state. Believing that they are fragile, 
ready to kill each other again and in need of a deep therapeutic intervention to 
                                                          
 15 See Krogstad (2014) for an interpretation that undoes this binary. 
 16 For instance, it is unsurprising that citizen satisfaction with the work of EULEX has been very 
low (below 30% most of the periods) and with EULEX police even lower, regardless of 
ethnicity (IPOL 2012: 15–17). 
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build their resilience,17 international administrators have undermined their moral 
and political autonomy.18 
In conclusion, international peacebuilders have aimed to solve the dilemmas 
present in post-conflict governance settings by promoting peacebuilding processes 
that are owned and led by local actors and facilitated by international 
administrators. Here, therefore, international regulation and local ownership are 
no longer categories in tension, let alone contradiction. This solution entails that 
international administrators still supervise the process, albeit less directly. This is 
justified given that post-war populations cannot yet make the right choices for 
themselves and ownership could still be more inclusive. For instance, Martin and 
Moser, while considering the difficulties in Kosovo’s statebuilding project, advocate 
that self-government is never fully permitted: ‘base the international presence 
around a perpetually renewable contract, in which international actors recognise, 
reassess and continuously reconfigure their responsibility in Kosovo in conjunction 
with local actors’ (2012: 24). The consequence is that these processes suspend the 
autonomy of post-conflict societies and seem to be questioning the equality 
between these people and the rest of states, who can address their problems 
autonomously in the political sphere. The last section seeks to expand on this 
conclusion by engaging with academic critical frameworks of peacebuilding, which 
presumably take the lead in caring for and tolerating the views of the local 
population. 
Hybrid peacebuilding: Embracing difference at the cost of equality?  
The critics of liberal peacebuilding highlight two main problems regarding how 
ownership is operationalized to explain the unsatisfactory outcomes of 
peacebuilding missions. 19 Firstly, these authors point out that recent policy 
concerns about local ownership represent only a rhetorical shift that is not realised 
in practice, where international and national agents still maintain asymmetrical 
power relations. For Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 775), for example, ‘local 
ownership’—like ‘partnership’ or ‘participation’—are merely ‘buzz phrases’ used by 
practitioners to gain local legitimacy and support. 20 Even if contemporary 
                                                          
 17 It is likely that the fragility of post-war states has been exaggerated in a paternalistic fashion. 
See Pupavac (2001: 358–64) for an analysis of how humanitarian responses have 
overemphasised the level of ‘trauma’ and ‘psychological suffering’ leading to the 
‘pathologisation’ of war-affected societies. 
 18 As Furedi (2011: 126) argues, ‘widespread scepticism about people’s capacity to respond to 
dangerous ideas with maturity indicates that society finds it difficult to take seriously the 
value of moral autonomy’. 
 19 By critics of liberal peace, I refer here to scholars who emphasise that practitioners have 
universalised understandings of peacebuilding practices and therefore have undermined the 
social and cultural dynamics of post-war societies. Here I will focus specifically on their 
critique of the way local ownership is practiced (e.g. Brigg 2010; Donais 2009a; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond 2013; Pouligny 2005; Richmond 2011). 
 20 Note that international administrators and policy-oriented academics also share the belief 
that ownership has not been translated into practice when they assess some negative results 
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policymakers specify that they are willing to place local actors on the driver’s seat, 
the critics nevertheless identify and censure the (liberal) elephant in the room. It is 
worth quoting Timothy Donais (2009a: 4), who has extensively reviewed issues of 
local ownership, at length: 
While the basic premise of peacebuilding, as Necla Tschirgi has 
suggested, is that peace cannot be imposed by external forces, 
military or otherwise, but must rather be nurtured through patient, 
flexible strategies carefully calibrated to the domestic political 
context, the empirical record suggests that peacebuilding in practice 
more closely resembles an externally driven exercise in both state 
building and social engineering. Local ownership of governance, in 
other words, is accepted in theory but rarely practiced. 
Donais straightforwardly criticises the practice of international peacebuilding 
because this is mainly top-down and externally driven, despite a firm intention of 
responding to local priorities. He suggests that the challenge today is to build 
bridges between theory and practice, to develop strategies more sensitive to the 
context of every situation (2008; 2009a; 2009b). Along these lines, Pouligny (2005: 
608) asserts that missions will fail unless internationals take a more ‘modest, 
flexible, patient and unobtrusive’ role that facilitates the process being led by local 
actors. 
Secondly, critical scholars are wary of how ownership is being promoted. They 
suggest that international administrators that seek to transfer authority to the 
local population rely on a narrow and ‘self-referential vision of civil society’—one 
that is based, for example, on liberal NGOs—and thus underestimate the plurality 
of views and possibilities that can be found in the everyday life of conflict-affected 
zones (Belloni 2001: 175–8). A direct consequence is that war-prone entrepreneurs, 
nationalist groups or other local ‘spoilers’, which do not represent the majority of 
the population, have co-opted ownership and dominated post-war political 
transitions. Donais (2009a: 16) argues that, besides capacity building, work should 
be done to promote ‘capacity disabling’ of some groups or some practices. This 
means that there ought to be ‘efforts to disable, marginalize, or co-opt those 
domestic political power structures that stand in the way of the effective 
establishment of new institutions’. For the critics, liberal peacebuilding operations 
should pursue a deeper engagement with diverse civil society groups in order to 
develop a bottom-up version of peace and overturn the risks that unrepresentative 
groups could co-opt the conflict resolution process (Pouligny 2005; Orjuela 2003). 
Critical scholars see the state-building project in Kosovo as a paradigmatic case in 
which international administrators have become complicit in reinforcing a divided 
society where nationalist views persist. It is argued that the policies of the UN 
Mission (UNMIK) in the immediate post-war period (before the EU Mission took 
charge of the country in 2008) such as the decentralisation of power to minorities 
have institutionalised ‘ethnicity’ and legitimised a polarised civil society dominated 
by ‘ethnic’ thinking in which reconciliation among groups is far from tangible (Hehir 
                                                                                                                                                              
of earlier international interventions (Chesterman 2007: 17; Nathan 2007: 1; Reich 2006: 14–
15). 
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2006: 205–7; Franks and Richmond 2008: 94). Almost consensually, these authors 
appeal for a reduction of the salience of ethnicity in order to foster an all-
encompassing peace process that could be owned by the nationals. The aim is to be 
respectful of diversity without reifying nationalist positions (Devic 2006: 270; 
Simonsen 2005: 298; Franks and Richmond 2008: 98–9). 
Against these two flaws identified above, critical frameworks seek to renovate 
the actual promotion of local ownership. The way forward depends on involving a 
great variety of actors, with a specific attention for the powerless, in a truly 
inclusive peace endeavour. Richmond (2011: 10) writes: 
Reforming the liberal peace model … requires an engagement with 
not just the currently fashionable and controversial issues of local 
ownership or local participation, but the far deeper ‘local-local’ (i.e. 
what lies beneath the veneer of internationally sponsored local 
actors and NGOs constituting a ‘civil’ as opposed to ‘uncivil’ society), 
which allows for genuine self-government, self-determination, 
democracy and human rights. 
While Richmond states that his aim is to allow for ‘genuine self-government’, this 
is not automatically conceived, but subordinated to an external engagement with 
the local-local. The notion of the ‘local-local’ thus deserves special attention.21 For 
Richmond (2011: 13–14), building peace in the plural—a peace attuned to the 
culture and needs of every society, which is distinct from the universally valid 
democratic peace idealised by the liberal gaze—ought to be practised by 
considering and enabling the ‘local-local’ and its critical agency. However, he 
argues, the challenge is that this deeper level is ‘hermeneutic, diverse, fluid, 
transnational and transversal’ and cannot be represented, analysed or governed 
from an external perspective. On this assumption, peacebuilding requires a plural, 
flexible and open understanding of difference, which does not essentialize or 
reduce difference to existing (Western-informed) forms of representation (see also 
Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 764). In other words, peacebuilding needs to be 
owned and led by the local-local actors, rather than driven by an elitist or narrow 
version of civil society 
This emancipatory form of peacebuilding—‘hybrid peace’—is committed to 
transferring responsibilities to ‘the local’ beyond ‘ethnocentric ways of knowing 
culture’, as Brigg (2010: 336–41) puts it. As a critical reappraisal of the liberal peace, 
proposals for hybrid peace demand the need to foster a context-sensitive 
peacebuilding process, which avoids the process being either controlled by 
domineering policy-advisors or co-opted by unrepresentative local leaders. 
Hybridity in this context is seen as a framework that corrects international peace 
practitioners and nationalist entrepreneurs, who both tend to conceptualise 
identity as static, homogenous and essentialist and thus undermine multiple forms 
of being and doing (Mac Ginty 2010: 397). There is confidence that a reflexive and 
agonistic conversation between multiple actors opens up new possibilities for 
cultivating a peace project that embraces difference and enables the local-local. As 
                                                          
 21 Mac Ginty and Richmond (2013: 774–5) define it as ‘the local that cannot be described as 
subscribing to liberal and neoliberal rationalities’. 
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Richmond (2012: 125) argues: ‘peace-building would be reframed as a process that 
reconstructs the everyday according to how its subjects need and want to live, 
where rights and needs are both contextually and internationally negotiated and 
enabled’. It is through this reflexive process and ‘cultural exchange’ between 
diverse international and local actors that hybrid proposals for peacebuilding seek 
to overcome the traps regarding the transfer of local ownership: ‘merging top-
down with bottom-up approaches in creative and culturally sensitive ways is also 
likely to enhance a sense among local populations of the legitimacy of the broader 
peacebuilding process’ (Donais 2009a: 19–20). In short, proposals for hybrid peace 
seek to rectify the problems related to post-conflict governance by means of 
cultivating a constructive and agonistic process that corrects invasive international 
attitudes and potentially pernicious local values or ideas. 
These critical perspectives are thus very similar to contemporary policy 
approaches of peacebuilding, which have already sought to abandon the top-down 
and intrusive projects of the late 1990s in order to facilitate and enhance a real 
process of ownership that is inclusive of diverse views. To be sure, although 
proposals for hybrid peace promise an even greater appreciation of the dynamics 
and resources of everyday life and a more sensitive engagement with the local (or 
the ‘local-local’), the process of transferring local ownership has not been 
translated into local self-government either. Although comparing policy and critical 
approaches goes beyond the scope of this article, I want to suggest here that 
critical views that defend a hybrid peace do not represent a step forward compared 
with current governance approaches: they are still being ‘intolerant’ to post-
conflict societies if ‘tolerance’ is, as Furedi (2011: 22) argues, ‘a positive orientation 
towards creating the conditions where people can develop their autonomy through 
the freedom to make choices’. Furedi starts from the assumption that people are 
autonomous subjects engaging in the world. Instead, very similar to policy 
frameworks, scholars who defend hybrid peace consider the ‘autonomy’ and 
‘freedom to make choices’ of post-war societies the problem to be corrected 
through a process of hybridisation that transcends the dichotomy of international 
‘colonisers’ and local ‘spoilers’. 
The negative implication is that these critical perspectives, in wanting to 
hybridise the process of peacebuilding in an effort to respect and appreciate the 
pluralism of post-war societies, eschew or belittle the autonomous demands 
openly voiced by different local actors. The willingness to build peace beyond 
current forms of political representation and identification gives little meaning to 
the present struggles faced by these societies. For example, Richmond (2011: 130) 
argues that the promise of a ‘post-liberal peace’ goes ‘beyond mere rationalism and 
sovereignty’, beyond ‘state institutions’ or ‘territorial’ constraints in order to aspire 
to true ‘democracy and self-determination’. But this promise is of little value for 
current concerns of most of the people in post-conflict societies who want 
sovereignty, territory and state institutions (e.g. Bosnia and Kosovo). Wishing to 
build peace beyond the dominant constellations of identity and difference, as 
William Connolly (1995: xiv) would say, these frameworks disregard the 
preferences and political positions that make sense for the local population.  
My suspicion is that, for contemporary frameworks of peacebuilding, the Other is 
not taken as the sovereign equal, but as the different whose peace ought to be 
Bargués-Pedreny  |  Conceptualising Local Ownership as ‘Reflexive Cooperation’ 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 11 19 
 
 
approached through a careful conversational and reflexive process of cooperation 
among multiple actors. It is not hard to see that questions of self-government and 
sovereignty, which cannot be thought of without a more or less stable notion of 
identity and difference (i.e. the local and the international), are increasingly seen as 
non-possibilities: they even become conceptually and politically ‘nonexistent’, no 
longer disputed.22 In lieu of a conclusion, it is argued that the cost of a discursive 
shift, which has sought to move away from universal approaches (considered 
intrusive and disrespectful of diversity) to emphasise difference, may be the 
difficulty to consider post-conflict populations as equals. On the assumption that 
these people are momentarily ‘inferior’, 23 incapable of being autonomous, the 
approaches analysed here (international peacebuilders from the beginning of the 
first decade of the 21st century until the present and academic critics of the liberal 
peace) have promoted ownership while adjourning self-government. This has been 
problematic, for instance, in the former Yugoslavia, where self-government has 
clearly been one of the central concerns of the local population. Yet different 
frameworks of peacebuilding have considered that international assistance is 
necessary to cultivate an emancipatory peace that is dynamic and plural, in which 
conflictive positions would disappear. Wanting to protect difference infinitely, the 
discourse of peacebuilding hides a paternalistic view of post-conflict societies that 
denies their equality and condemns them to appreciate and enjoy their differences 
in a process in which self-government is continuously deferred. 
Conclusion 
This article has explored the apparent paradox in contemporary democratisation 
and post-conflict settings of a growing commitment to promote local ownership 
and the reluctance to grant self-government to war-affected populations. I have 
argued that far from being understood as a strategy containing a paradox, the 
concept of local ownership is increasingly seen as a learning relation or a process of 
reflexive cooperation between international and national actors to resolve a 
fundamental dilemma affecting governance missions: either having overly invasive 
international actors or devolving power to unrepresentative or potentially violent 
local agents. In the first section, I explained how liberal peacebuilding frameworks 
introduced ownership at the end of the 1990s both as a mechanism for bettering 
the results of previous missions and a politically correct concept to improve the 
practices and relations between interveners and intervened upon. However, the 
notion of ownership appeared at a time in which there was a great scepticism with 
democratic processes and thus it had to be postponed until certain social and 
political conditions were met. In its inception, therefore, ownership could be 
considered little more than window dressing that allowed post-war societies to 
implement policies that had been engineered by donors. 
                                                          
 22 I would like to thank Jessica Schmidt for discussing this point with me. 
 23 See Friedman for a critique of the hierarchical assumptions underpinning hybrid approaches 
(2002). 
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In the second section, I argued that contemporary policy frameworks have 
intended to correct the gap between the theory and the practice of the peace 
missions and deconstruct the conflictive relation between international and local 
actors. In the last few years, local ownership has become both the means and the 
apparent end of the mission (even if this outcome is constantly adjourned) and the 
role of peacebuilders has become secondary in order to facilitate a mutual learning 
and cooperative process of peace. However, it has been argued that their role as 
mere ‘facilitators’ is still considered crucial in war-affected situations. Even if 
ownership has become a sine qua non principle for any peacebuilding process, this 
has not been translated into de facto self-determination or self-government. The 
problem is that the citizens in states like Bosnia or Kosovo, who have demanded 
self-government, have been constrained on the assumption that they are not 
prepared to take sovereign decisions. In this sense, I have argued that the 
promotion of ownership has undermined the moral and political autonomy of post-
war societies. At the very least, processes of local ownership are in constant 
tension with the pleas and interests of the (majority of the) people. 
In the third section, this article analysed critical views of liberal peacebuilding. 
Hybrid peace frameworks seek to rectify international domineering attitudes 
without transferring ownership to unrepresentative local agents by cultivating a 
process of agonistic relation between multiple self-reflexive actors. Yet it has been 
argued that the attempt to transfer ownership to the local-local—this is to 
consider diverse and unrepresented communities and individuals often excluded 
with the broad term of ‘local’ or ‘civil society’—seems to offer solutions of little 
value to conflict-affected people. In plain English, while critical frameworks project 
an inclusive peace process in which statehood, territory or security are no longer 
relevant and hence are not exclusive of non-majority groups,24 meanwhile, before 
this promise of peace is fulfilled, sovereignty, territory and security are the desires 
of the majority of post-war populations. Along similar lines to policy approaches, 
therefore, hybrid peace perspectives have belittled the priorities of local agents 
that are not considered plural, emancipatory, hybrid or open to difference, and 
have legitimised further international assistance. The question remains whether, 
within frameworks of peacebuilding that have increasingly sought to embrace 
difference and promoted a more inclusive local ownership process, the equality of 
post-war societies has been degraded. 
 
  
                                                          
 24 See, for instance, Richmond’s promise of peace: ‘A deterritorialised, non-sovereign polity 
would be the outcome of incorporating the everyday as a key priority of peacebuilding in 
desecuritised form, maximising critical agency rather than the national interest of the state or 
interests of donors (2011: 138–9). 
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